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INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of education is transmission of knowledge. Not only
has knowledge been a central topic in philosophy, at least since Greek
antiquity, but in recent years, it has been a prominent issue in the study
of expertise. Reflecting on expertise has led to new insights about several
long-standing philosophical questions beyond epistemology, including the
nature of rationality and intuition. The aim of this article is to discuss three
views of expertise that have something important to say about these philo-
sophical issues. While two of these views come from philosophy (Dreyfus
and Dreyfus, 1986, hereafter D&D; Montero and Evans, 2011, hereafter,
M&E) and one frompsychology (Gobet andChassy, 2009, hereafter, G&C),
they all address similar philosophical questions, albeit with rather differ-
ent conclusions. The article first briefly reviews the issue of defining and
identifying expertise and the philosophical debate around knowing-how
and knowing-that. After presenting the key assumptions made by the three
views on expertise, it compares them along six philosophical dimensions:
rationality, knowledge, intuition, introspection, deliberation and artificial
intelligence. In the discussion, the article draws conclusions for education.
Philosophy and education share a common interest in knowledge. While
philosophy has enquired on the nature of knowledge and its truth value,
education has focused on the transmission of knowledge through teaching.
Obviously, different philosophical answers will lead to different educa-
tional practices. For example, whether knowledge is best characterised as
knowing-how or knowing-that—a question to which we will return often
in this article—will have different implications for education, including the
kind of representations used by teachers and the likelihood that knowledge
acquired about one topic (e.g. geometry) will transfer to another one (e.g.
physics).
Before discussing the extent to which expertise sheds light on the philo-
sophical issues we have just highlighted, we need to define the term ‘expert’.
The definition is actually trickier than seems the case at first blush, as was
already noted in Plato’s Charmides, where it was argued that distinguishing
C© 2017 The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
606 F. Gobet
a fake physician from a true one would challenge even a wise person. This
issue is made more poignant when it is realised that there exist surprisingly
many fake experts—individuals who are thought to be experts while in fact
they do not have the required skills and/or qualifications. Examples include
bogus doctors (around 10,000 in the US only!), a Defence Minister and an
Education Minister in Germany who had plagiarised parts of their PhD, and
a conman who sold fake weapon detectors (actually £15 gadgets used to
find golf balls) for £10,000 each, earning more than £55 million and causing
thousands of deaths in Iraq (Gobet, 2016b).
In contrast, there are domains of expertise where identifying experts
is not problematic, such as chess and tennis. In such domains, superior
performance can be replicated in the laboratory and thus the status of the
expert confirmed. It is thus worthwhile distinguishing between two kinds
of expertise (Gobet, 2016b): performance-based expertise (p-expertise) and
reputation based expertise (r-expertise). Fortunately for our analysis, the
three views we will discuss focus on p-expertise, drawing examples mostly
fromchess,where an objective andwidely-usedmeasure of skill is available.
KNOWING-HOW AND KNOWING-THAT
Traditionally, philosophers have adopted a position known as intellectual-
ism: explicit knowledge (aka knowing-that or propositional knowledge) is
the primary formof knowledge, and tacit knowledge (knowing-how) derives
from it. In other words, knowing-how can always be translated into proposi-
tions. An important exception to this dominant viewwas Ryle (1946, 1949),
who argued that knowing-that and knowing-how are not the same kind of
knowledge, in that it is not possible to reduce knowing-how to knowing-
that. In addition, knowing-that does not necessarily deliver the same skills
that knowing-how does. Thus, one can know-that without knowing-how
in a particular domain, as Ryle illustrates with chess: ‘We can imagine a
clever player generously imparting to his stupid opponent so many rules,
tactical maxims, “wrinkles”, etc., that he could think of no more to tell him;
his opponent might accept and memorise all of them, and be able and ready
to recite them correctly on demand. Yet he might still play chess stupidly,
that is, be unable intelligently to apply the maxims, etc.’ (Ryle, 1946, p. 5).
Ryle’s proposal has led to much debate in philosophy. Critiques have dis-
puted the epistemological value of differentiating between knowing-how
and knowing-that (e.g. Stanley and Williamson, 2001; White, 1982) and
claimed that the concept of knowledge-how is ill-defined (e.g. Snowdon,
2004). Crucially, the question of knowing-that and knowing-how is central
to the study of expertise. It will play an important role in the three views
discussed in this paper.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY TO EDUCATION
Before going into the subject matter of this paper, it is worth briefly re-
viewing two examples showing that philosophical analysis can illuminate
applied issues related to education. The first example examines the meaning
of knowing-how. To answer questions about vocational and professional
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education, Winch (2010) studied professional bricklaying qualifications in
eight countries of the European Union. A first important conclusion is that
know-how contains a fundamental ambiguity in English. ‘A knows how to
F’ has two possible meanings: (a) A can carry out F, and (b) A can provide
an account of how F is carried out. This ambiguity is not present in French
(savoir faire vs. savoir comment faire) and in German (ko¨nnen vs. wissen
wie).
A second important conclusion is that it is essential to understand how
initially providing instruction in the form of propositional knowledge is
related to practice (Winch, 2009). This has implications for the distinction
made by Ryle between knowing-how and knowing-that, and in particular
suggests that the importance of knowing-that is not fully appreciated in
many forms of knowing-how, such as making judgements.
The second example deals with the discrepancy between what is
expected by an industry and what actually happens. Boyd and Addis
(2010, 2011) interviewed senior managers and bricklayers and identified
clear divergences between the sort of knowledge that the industry as-
sumed to be essential and what was observed in real life. The industry
emphasised technical and factual knowledge, but working practices relied
much more on non-factual knowledge (e.g. the proper way to deal with
people).
THREE VIEWS ON EXPERTISE
There exist many approaches accounting for various aspects of expertise in
philosophy, psychology and other social sciences. The three views discussed
in this paper have been selected because (a) they discuss the philosophical
concepts identified in the introduction; (b) they discuss at length the same
domain, chess, the domain of expertise that has been most researched and
discussed in academy; and (c) there has been cross-discussion between the
authors of the central ideas defended in these papers. It should be noted
at the outset that these views use different types of evidence to support
their claims. D&D mostly use references to the philosophical literature,
thought experiments, anecdotal evidence and the reader’s intuitions on the
way human expertise works. M&E use similar sources, but also refer to
experimental data from psychology. Finally, G&C draw evidence from
experimental data in psychology and from computer simulations.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (1986) View on Expertise
HubertDreyfus’s interest in human expertise stems fromhis phenomenolog-
ical critique of the symbolic approach in artificial intelligence, in particular
the research programme carried out by Newell and Simon (1972), Minsky
(1977) and McCarthy (1968). A key argument of his bookWhat Computers
Can’t Do (1972) was that humans do not use discrete symbols and rules
(i.e. propositional knowledge) to perceive and make decisions but rather
do this holistically. The holistic nature of human cognition is, according
to Dreyfus, particularly apparent with experts. This conclusion naturally
led to another book, Mind over Machine (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986),
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co-authored with his brother Stuart, in which they developed a five-stage
theory of expertise (see also Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1984, 1996, 2005). Tar-
geting the then widely held opinion that expert systems would equal or
even better human performance (e.g. Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1983),
the book concludes that expert systemswill at best perform at the level of hu-
man non-experts: while human experts act intuitively and use context-bound
and embodied knowledge, experts systems employ discrete, context-free
and disembodied rules, just like non-experts. In other words, while human
experts use knowing-how, expert systems are stuck with knowing-that and
thus cannot act in the fluid and natural way that characterises human experts’
behaviour.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) identify five stages of expertise. In the first
stage, ‘novices’ learn domain-specific facts, features and actions through
instruction. They use rules independently of the context, in a rigidmanner. It
is only after considerable concrete experience with a particular domain that
the second stage is reached. In that stage, ‘advanced beginners’ start using
situational elements that incorporate meaningful information about the
context. In the third stage, ‘competent’ individuals become more efficient
and start organising decision-making procedures in a hierarchical way.
However, the kind of planning used is still largely conscious and deliberate.
In the fourth stage, ‘proficient’ individuals now perceive some features as
salient and pay no attention to others. They are able to categorise and grasp
problem situations intuitively, but they must still think analytically when
making decisions about their future actions. In the final stage, ‘experts’
display a fluid and intuitive behaviour not only for understanding the
problem situation, but also for deciding what actions to carry out next.
When tasks are ordinary, ‘experts don’t solve problems and don’t make
decisions; they do what normally works’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986,
pp. 30–31).
Montero and Evans (2011)
Montero and Evans (2011) provide both a critique of Dreyfus’s theory
and propose their own view on expertise, based on McDowell’s (1994,
2007a, 2007b) theory of rationality. Contrasting with D&D, M&E ar-
gue that experts follow rules consciously, and that this represents rational
action. Two types of rules are considered. The first type is not particu-
larly interesting philosophically: in a game such as chess, experts know
the rules of the game and, if required do so, can state them explicitly.
The second type of rules—heuristics rules—are at the centre of the know-
how/know-that debate. Two classes of heuristics are considered, and both
are assumed to be known explicitly and used consciously. First, there are
basic heuristic rules (e.g. ‘Control the centre’ in chess); these are often
not very predictive, because they might conflict with each other. Second,
there are specific, advanced heuristic rules (e.g. ‘When White carries out a
minority attack in the Exchange Variation of the Queen’s Gambit Declined
opening, the Queen’s rook should be placed on b1, not c1’). These heuristics
are both powerful and also subject to exception: ‘Although Grandmasters
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can usually beat International masters or weaker players without ever rely-
ing on anything beyond heuristics, it is times where specific heuristics are
flouted which decide who wins in games between Grandmasters’ (M&E,
p. 182).
A key assumption of M&E’s view is that experts are rational, in the
sense that they can consciously justify their decisions. M&E’s emphasis on
conscious rationality suggests that they are sceptical about the importance
of intuition, and this is indeed the case. According to M&E (p. 189), ‘the
psychological data on the relative importance of intuition for players of
different strengths is mixed’. They argue that intuition, when present, is
rational—the processes leading to the intuition can be articulated—as can
be seen in M&E’s following example: ‘I saw that the position was a Dragon
Sicilian Yugoslav Attack, and so I instantly saw that sacrificing on the h-file
would lead to checkmate, as it inevitably does in those kinds of positions’
(p. 191).
In line with their view of human rationality and the rule-following char-
acter of human cognition, M&E also argue that experts have reliable ac-
cess to their thoughts, and they ‘see no reason to think that chess players
are radically mistaken about what goes on in their minds during games’
(p. 188).
Gobet and Chassy’s (2009) View on Expert Intuition
Gobet and Chassy (2009) use the template theory of expertise (Gobet and
Simon, 1996) to theorise about expert intuition, focusing on chess and
nursing. While developed originally to account for chess data, the theory,
which is implemented as computer programs (Gobet, 1997; Gobet and
Simon, 2000), is a general theory and accounts for the development of
expertise in domains such as games, science, engineering and sports, and
has been applied to other aspects of cognition such as the acquisition of
language and concept formation (Gobet et al., 2001; Simon and Gobet,
2000).
Referring to Simon’s (1982) theory of bounded rationality, G&C assert
that human rationality is strictly limited. That is, attention can be heeded to
just one thing at a time, the capacity of visual short-term memory is limited
to four items, and searching through the problem space of possible states is
slow (perhaps ten positions in a minute in chess). These limitations apply
both to novices and experts.
Two features help experts circumvent these limitations. First, when mak-
ing decisions, they carry out a highly selective search; this is made possible
by efficient, albeit narrowly focused problem-solving methods and heuris-
tics. Second, they simplify decisions by acquiring large amounts of knowl-
edge, learning how to apply previously successful solutions to new problem
situations. Following Simon and Chase’s (1973) work, it is proposed that a
large part of this knowledge is stored as ‘chunks’, which are units both of
perception and meaning that are built recursively. The presence of chunks
allows experts to perceive stimuli as groups of objects rather than individual
objects. When some patterns are often present in the environment, they may
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lead to the acquisition of a template (schema), which originally is built on a
chunk (the ‘core’ of the template). A template is a more complex structure
than a chunk, for it also possesses one or several ‘slots’, where variable
information can be encoded.
In line with the assumption of bounded rationality, learning is assumed
to be relatively slow: 8 seconds to create a new chunk, and 2 seconds to
add information to an existing chunk. The construction and use of chunks
and templates is not exclusive to expertise, but is underpinned by basic
mechanisms that are also used in many other domains, including concept
formation and the acquisition of language (Gobet, 2016a; Gobet and Lane,
2010).
As the result of practice and study, chunks and templates may be associ-
ated with possible actions, such as what move to play or what plan to follow
in chess. Thus, we have what Newell and Simon (1972) term ‘productions’:
a condition linked to an action. An example of such a production could be:
‘Given an open line, put a rook on it’. An important class of actions includes
instructions about where to move one’s eye and thus direct attention (De
Groot and Gobet, 1996). Thus, G&C assume a close interaction between
knowledge and perception: template theory ‘includes mechanisms detailing
how perception determines what will be learned, on the one hand, and
how learned knowledge determines what will be perceived, on the other’
(Gobet and Chassy, 2008, p. 161). Intuition is explained mostly by the
idea that recognised patterns activate productions that provide relevant
information from long-term memory, and by emotions that act as an alert
system.
APPLICATION OF THE THREE VIEWS TO PHILOSOPHICAL KEY
THEMES
We are now in a position to discuss what each of the three views says about
the key philosophical themes we have mentioned in the introduction. The
reader should note that there is some overlap between these themes; for
example, the discussion of ‘rational intuition’ pertains both to rationality
and intuition.
Rationality
The question of rationality is answered bluntly by Dreyfus: experts are
arational, in that they are not able to defend their actions rationally. ‘[T]he
master may make moves that are entirely intuitive and contrary to any
preconceived plan. In such instances, when asked why he did what he did,
he may be at a loss to reconstruct a reasoned account of his actions because
there is none. ( . . . ) Nothing about the position need be nameable and
thinkable as a reason for acting’ (Dreyfus, 2005, pp. 54–55). The essence
of expertise is to act intuitively without much, if any, deliberation. It is
individuals at the novice, advanced beginner and competent stage who
use deliberation and analytic thinking and thus could justify their actions.
However, these individuals are not experts.
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M&E’s motivate their own position by first criticising D&D’s theory.
They note that, whilst D&D argue that experts rarely rely on attention
and deliberation, there is actually considerable empirical data showing
that experts, for example in chess, carry out much look-ahead search (e.g.
De Groot, 1978). M&E actually take the opposite position to Dreyfus:
experts are always able to provide rational justifications for their actions,
and expert intuition in fact depends on reason. This position is similar to
that advocated by McDowell (1994) in his theory of rationality.
G&C adopt a middle ground position. Experts are not arational or fully
rational, but they show a rationality that is limited, in that they occasion-
ally make minor and every so often even major mistakes (for evidence, see
Gobet, 2016b). For example, in the case of chess, full rationality entails a
systematic search of all logical possibilities, and minimaxing. This is not
possible due to humans’ limits in short-term memory, learning rates and
speed in generating new positions. Experts therefore show high selectiv-
ity in their search behaviour, made possible by their knowledge, both tacit
and declarative. This selectivity allows them to rapidly focus on favourable
options whilst ignoring irrelevant ones—a point powerfully emphasised
by D&D. Whilst this runs the risk of missing optimal moves, it is highly
adaptive, as decisions can be made rapidly if necessary. In line with psycho-
logical research on expertise, G&C propose that some of experts’ decisions
aremade intuitively, using pattern recognition, while others dependmore on
conscious analysis and enumeration of possible moves and countermoves.
According to Gobet (2012), there is a difference between how experts de-
cide and justify actions. With the former, experts use a combination of tacit
knowledge, declarative knowledge and look-ahead search. With the latter,
they rely on conscious rules and validations based on conclusions from
analysis.
Since part of experts’ decision-making is intuitive and relies on percep-
tual cues that are unconscious or at best difficult to verbalise, they cannot
always justify their decisions. Thus, they do not display rationality in the
sense of D&D and M&E. Importantly, they do not display either the kind
of (full) rationality often discussed in the social sciences, defined as the
ability to make the best possible decisions for achieving one’s goals, given
one’s knowledge. Rather, they display bounded rationality (Simon, 1956,
1982).
Knowledge
To what extent do experts follow rules? D&D argues that experts do not do
it: they just act intuitively. Thus, they defend a pure version of knowing-
how. In fact, according to D&D, rule-following is a characteristic of non-
experts. M&E criticise this view, arguing that it is inconsistent with the
fact that experts use both basic and advanced heuristic rules. For them, the
use of heuristics (i.e. rules) is the essence of expertise—a pure version of
knowing-that.
As with other dimensions, G&C’s view avoids extremes. With D&D, it
agrees that some knowledge is intuitive; with M&E, it agrees that some
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knowledge is rule-based. GC also discuss two possibilities rarely consid-
ered in the knowing-how/knowing-that debate in philosophy. In line with
much research in psychology (e.g. Fitts, 1964), they assume that some rules
initially encoded declaratively later lead to the creation of procedural knowl-
edge that can be used unconsciously. They also argue that the creation of
productions using perceptual patterns means that some unconscious rules
are created without ever being conscious (a possibility not discussed by
M&E). In fact, at least two psychological theories of expertise (chunking
theory and template theory) consider that such productions are critical for
the acquisition of expertise. Automatic visual pattern recognition has the
advantage over explanations depending on language of explaining how ex-
pertise can develop in visuo-spatial domains where it is difficult to code the
information verbally.
Intuition
Intuition plays a central role in D&D’s view of expertise: for them, expertise
is intuition. While intuition characterises expertise, deliberation typifies
non-expertise. As noted above, a key feature of intuition is that it is arational.
Again, M&E take issue with this view and argue that intuition is rational
and that it is possible for experts to justify their actions consciously. G&C
tend to agree with D&D on the question of intuition. In fact, one of the
criteria of their definition of intuition (Gobet and Chassy, 2008, p. 130) is
that experts cannot verbalise why they have made their choice and what
steps they have taken. In addition, they point out that emotions, which
mostly are unconscious, affect experts’ decisions in important ways (Benner
et al., 1996; Tikhomirov and Vinogradov, 1970), enabling rapid decisions
to be made. G&C also emphasise the importance of pattern recognition,
and thus perception, in expert decision-making. As stated by de Groot
and Gobet (1996, p. 1), ‘ . . . the two areas of thinking and perception are
hardly ever separable, and in many cases even indistinguishable. “Pure”
thinking—human information processing without any perceptual intake in
the process—is extremely rare. In problem solving tasks, the problems are
necessarily presented in perceivable form; but in most cases they are also
operated upon perceptually’.
Introspection
A related issue is whether experts have full access to their own think-
ing. D&D argue that this is not the case, given the intuitive nature of
decision-making. M&E imply that experts do, given that they can justify
their decisions. G&C adopt an intermediate position. Some thinking is
accessible to consciousness. For example, in many domains, asking experts
to think aloud when making a decision generates protocols that provide
fairly reliable evidence about their thinking processes. Indeed, a subfield
of expertise research has used precisely this method, which has sometimes
yielded surprising results, for example with chess players. However,
the method has limits, in particular with visuo-spatial domains or with
domains in which actions occur rapidly (Gobet, 2009). In addition, there is
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sometimes a disconnect between conscious thought (as inferred from verbal
protocols) and actual actions, even with experts. For example, Bilalic´ et al.
(2008) recorded the eye movements of chess experts trying to find the best
move in a novel position. The position had two solutions: one familiar and
non-optimal, and one unusual and optimal. All players found the familiar
solution, and were asked to find a better one. Players said they did so. How-
ever, the eye-movement recordings showed that players kept directing their
gaze towards the elements of the board position that were relevant for the
familiar solution and not those important for the optimal solution. This dis-
sociation between the actual location of attention and what players thought
they were looking at means that, at least in some cases, experts are not able
to access the contents of their thoughts correctly, with the consequence that
post hoc rationalisations affect the reasons they provide for their decision.
Deliberation
D&D argue that experts rarely use attention and deliberation; when they do
so, they do not behave like experts but revert to the behaviour of individuals
that are only at the competent stage. Thus, as mentioned several times,
deliberation is seen as a sign of lack of expertise: ‘the enemy of expertise
is thought’ (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 354). More specifically, they negate the
importance of look-ahead search in chess, or even that it takes place. But
obviously, chess players spend longminutes thinking in competitive games;
so, what do they do during this time? D&D explicitly rejects the possibility
that they carry out look-ahead search: ‘While most expert performance is
ongoing and nonreflective, when time permits and outcomes are crucial,
an expert will deliberate before acting. But ( . . . ) this deliberation does not
require calculative problem solving, but rather involves critically reflecting
on one’s intuitions’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, pp. 31–32).
M&E criticise D&D’s position, and based both on the psychological lit-
erature and personal recollections of the second author (Evans), who is a
chess master, state that attention, deliberation and look-ahead search are
important. However, they make it clear that recursively calculating the con-
sequences of possible moves supplements rather than replaces heuristics.
Thus, ‘merely learning a grandmaster’s repertoire of heuristic rules may
not turn a competent player into a grandmaster not because the grandmas-
ter never relies on heuristic rules when deciding on a move, but rather
because in addition to heuristic rules, calculating out the consequences of
moves and intuition and [sic] plays a role’ (Montero and Evans, 2011,
p. 182).
G&C also criticise D&D’s negation of chess players’ search behaviour,
given the overwhelming empirical evidence for it in the verbal protocols
analysed in De Groot (1965) and later studies (e.g. Charness, 1981; Gobet,
1986, 1998; Saariluoma, 1995). They note that, while deliberation and
search are important, they are closely intertwinedwith perceptual processes.
Thus, in most cases, it is not possible to speak of pure deliberation, as
perceptual pattern recognition is closely linked to search behaviour, among
other things explaining its selectivity.
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Artificial Intelligence
Knowledge plays a central role in expert systems, which encode the knowl-
edge used by human experts in order to solve problems (e.g. diagnosis or
troubleshooting) at the level of human experts. In order to be used, human
knowledge must first be elicited and formalised. As this subfield of artificial
intelligence has led to applications in education (e.g. intelligent tutoring
systems), it is worth discussing it here.
As noted earlier, D&D (see also Dreyfus, 1972) attack the assumption
that experts’ knowledge can be formalised using declarative rules. In their
view, expert systems are bound to fail, as their knowledge is not embodied,
experiential and situated. Thus, even sophisticated knowledge-elicitation
techniques can capture, in the best case, only the knowledge of competent
individuals.
SinceM&Eassume thatmost heuristics are accessible to consciousness—
else, it would not be possible for experts to justify their actions—they must
agree that expert knowledge can be coded and used by expert systems.
Thus, the assumption of rationality also means that expert knowledge can
be easily communicated to fellow humans.
As with many other dimensions, G&C adopt an intermediate position.
With Dreyfus, they agree that some knowledge is intuitive and procedural,
and thus cannot be communicated as propositions explicitly. With M&E,
they agree that some knowledge is declarative and can be coded as propo-
sitions, and thus can be used by computers. Where they are more optimistic
than D&D with respect to formalisation of expert knowledge, is about
the possibility of artificial systems learning procedural knowledge (what
we called productions earlier) given the right kind of input (e.g. masters’
games). In principle, it should be possible to achieve this with the programs
used to implement template theory.
DISCUSSION
As it should be clear by now, there are substantial differences between the
three views discussed in this paper. These differences are summarised in
Table 1. However, the aim of this paper is not to directly compare the views
with the goal of finding a winner (see Gobet, 2016b, for a more adversarial
approach); rather, it is to evaluate to what extent they raise questions about
central themes in philosophy, and what philosophical light they shed on
education.
While the striking disagreement between the three views raises impor-
tant questions about the nature of expertise and knowledge, there is nothing
particular about it. The presence of fundamental disagreements between
experts is common in academia, including ‘hard’ sciences, as we are re-
minded by historians and philosophers of science. (Think, for example,
about the debates surrounding the nature of life in biology.) It is in fact an
issue actively researched in social epistemology, and known as epistemic
peer disagreement (e.g. Gutting, 1982). Part of the disagreement can be ex-
plained by the differences in values between the three views; for example,
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Table 1. Summary of the key attributes of the three target theories
Dreyfus and
Dreyfus (1986)
Montero and
Evans (2011)
Gobet and
Chassy (2012)
Rationality Arational Rational Boundedly rational
Knowledge Knowing-how Knowing-that Both
Holistic Decomposable Both
Unsconscious Conscious Mostly Unconscious
Intuition Critical Not critical Critical
Introspection Impossible Possible Mostly impossible
Deliberation Not important Relevant, but not
critical
Critical
Artificial intelligence Impossible Possible Possible, but difficult
while D&D espouse a non-mechanistic view of the world, G&C clearly
adopt a mechanistic view.
Implications for Education
Of the three views, M&E’s view leads to the most straightforward impli-
cations and also implies a fairly unproblematic transmission of knowledge.
Assuming full rationality, in the sense of being able to justify actions, im-
plies that (advanced) heuristics are fully accessible to consciousness, in a
propositional format (knowing-that). Thus, heuristics can be used for teach-
ing beginners and more advanced individuals. (As seen above, they can also
be used for building expert systems.) Thus, once rules have been elicited
from an expert, teachers can teach them explicitly, presumably using ex-
amples and exercises to verify correct learning and provide other feedback.
There is no problem in identifying and transmitting such rules.
Of course, D&D argue that teaching heuristics is not possible at levels
higher than the third, competent stage. (Still, one could argue that teaching
rules canmove somebody fully ignorant of a domain to the competent stage,
which is not to be sneered at from an educational point of view.) For reaching
higher stages, it is illusory to try to teach rules or propositional knowledge.
According to D&D, the way forward is to put learners in context, so that
practical knowledge (knowing-how) can be acquired. This approach has
been extensively used in nursing by Benner (Benner, 1984; Benner et al.,
1996), whose efforts were directly inspired by D&D’s view. The core of
Benner’s instructional method is to de-emphasise the role of propositional
knowledge, including theoretical knowledge, and to emphasise the necessity
of acquiring intuitive knowledge, including being emotionally involvedwith
patients.
As noted earlier, G&C often take a middle ground between D&D and
M&E. As can be seen for example in the many textbooks on chess strategy
and tactics, some expert knowledge can be transmitted propositionally.
However, their view also assumes the presence of knowing-how that is
harder to transmit, not the least because it is closely linked to perceptual
information.
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Several consequences of G&C’s view, and template theory more gener-
ally, might be mentioned here (Gobet, 2005, 2015). Given the assumption
that discrete chunks underpin expert knowledge, it is possible to design in-
structionalmethods that decompose thematerial to teach into small slices. In
addition, the way the material is segmented and its ordering can then be op-
timised. Finally, the hierarchical nature of knowledge implied by chunking
suggests that it is beneficial to teach the material from simple to complex.
The assumption that some chunks evolve into more complex knowledge
structures—templates—also affords the possibility of designing methods
for facilitating their acquisition. For example, the idea that variability is key
for the creation of templates suggests instructional methods encouraging
a diversity of examples and exercises. These ideas can be embedded in
computer-based tutors (Gobet andWood, 1999). Ideally, learners should be
put in real-life situations only after basic and complex skills are acquired
through these methods.
The methods described in the previous paragraph are based on strong
epistemological assumptions: target skills can be identified; knowledge can
be decomposed; and simplified problems can be developed to optimise
teaching. In contrast, D&D argue that these methods are not viable, because
expertise is holistic and cannot be dissected into components. The only way
to teach expertise is to place individuals in contextual situations in which
they face real-life tasks and problems.
The contrast betweenM&E’s view andG&C’s view is instructive as well.
M&E assume that learning the correct (advanced) heuristics (i.e. knowing-
that) leads to expert performance, assuming the ability to carry out correct
look-ahead search when necessary. By contrast, G&C argue that there is a
disconnect between knowing-that and knowing-how: acquiring knowing-
how requires the acquisition of a large number of perceptual patterns and
productions, which is time consuming even after heuristics have been fully
memorised.
There is currently considerable interest in the possibility that acquiring
skill in one domain (e.g. chess) leads to benefits in other domains (e.g.
mathematics) or increases in general cognitive ability (e.g. visual-spatial
intelligence). Interestingly, the three views agree about the difficulty of
such transfer of skill. D&D’s view, because intuitive knowledge is context-
dependent; M&E’s view, because advanced heuristics are specific to a
particular domain; and G&C’s view, because knowing-how is linked to
specific perceptual knowledge. Recent reviews of literature about chess,
music and working memory training all concluded that transfer is indeed
difficult and rare (Sala and Gobet, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed three different views on expertise. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, these views differed widely on most of the philosophical issues
considered. They also led to starkly different implications for education:
there is little agreement about educational issues and advice, except about
the difficulty of transferring knowledge from one domain to another.
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A naı¨ve hope was perhaps to expect that theorising about expertise would
lead to clear-cut answers both for philosophy and education. This was far
frombeing the case, as could be seen for examplewith thewide variability of
opinions about one of the recurring themes of this paper, the debate between
knowing-how vs. knowing-that. There is simply no clear-cut answer. In a
sense, this discussion has raised more questions than it has answered—not
necessarily a bad thing.
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